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 Social Stratification in the Gulf Cooperation Council States 
NORA ANN COLTON∗ 
Abstract 
This study attempts to give the reader an understanding of social stratification in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states – Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, 
the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Using the principal–agent theoretical 
framework for examining both the socio-economic splintering of society and the 
internal workings that have shaped various groups within these societies, this study 
hopes to be a departure from the rentier model for examining the Gulf states. This 
study will consider various social groups in the GCC as one population with the 
intent of identifying how they act and react to each other. Examining the socio-
economic forces that have shaped the GCC states and the Arabian Peninsula in this 
framework makes possible a better explanation and understanding of present-day 
social stratification. The study concludes that social stratification in the Gulf is 
based on one’s affiliation to the ruling family, first and foremost. This situation 
creates a number of divides within society, most importantly the division based on 
nationality. Whether or not one is considered a national of the country one resides 
in is extremely important in determining one’s place in society and one’s 
entitlements.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries underwent a rapid transition in the 
twentieth century that is often trivially attributed to the export of oil and the mass 
consumption of goods. However, the post-World War II period and, subsequently, the 
nationalization of the oil industry are much more nuanced and profound. The post-World 
War II period represents an important turning point in the role and power of the state. In 
the late 1950s, various governments in the region began to assert themselves in terms of 
managing and controlling their oil industries and their revenues. In 1949, Venezuela first 
approached Iran, Iraq, Kuwait (even though it had not then become an independent state) 
and Saudi Arabia about the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). Although OPEC did not formally meet until years later, during this 
earlier period, various governments in the region started to enter into new and better deals 
with foreign oil companies through a process of joint ventures on territory instead of 
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making concessions through treaty. These actions led to increased revenue to the states, 
but also, more importantly, the beginning of a more conscious state actor. 
Although the most widely used approach to examining a socio-economic 
phenomenon in this region is to view it from the standpoint of the petroleum industry 
(owners of factors of production), this study hopes to give a deeper understanding of the 
social stratification that has evolved by considering the petroleum industry as one of the 
many factors that have shaped social relationships in this region, instead of as the sole 
factor. Furthermore, this study employs the principal–agent theoretical framework for 
examining not only the socio-economic splintering of society, but also the internal 
workings that have shaped these various groups. Lastly, there has been a tendency to 
view the indigenous population as functioning in a vacuum with the foreign population 
solely as its keepers. These are complex societies consisting of many layers of both 
indigenous peoples and foreigners who come together to constitute a whole society. A 
number of studies focus on various groups of either indigenous peoples or foreigners, but 
few appreciate how these various groups function as a whole society. This study 
examines these various populations as one population with different layers, with the 
intent of identifying how they act and react to each other. Examining the socio-economic 
forces that have shaped the GCC states in this framework makes possible a better 
explanation and understanding of present-day social stratification. 
The study starts with a historical overview as a means of demonstrating the 
complexity of the interworking of the region and the historical roots of present-day states, 
followed by a look at the principal–agent approach as a framework of analysis. This 
study then will primarily be dedicated to presenting various case studies, including all six 
GCC member states. The case study approach goes country by country to allow for 
distinctions in practices and structures as well as internal characteristics that may not be 
common to all these countries. While common themes are noted, the paper does not 
attempt to make direct comparisons given the inadequate data that is available for 
pursuing such an approach; this approach does not preclude the emergence of common 
themes from these various case studies. The conclusion draws lessons from the case 
studies with the hope of providing a present-day picture of social stratification in the 
GCC. 
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2. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Prior to World War II, the Gulf region had a merchant class who made their living in 
trading, pearling and/or slavery. This wealth started to dissipate for various reasons at 
various rates throughout the region as oil revenues, in the hands of state actors, increased. 
The interiors of most states were peopled with Bedouin tribes that sustained themselves 
by animal husbandry and trade. Agriculture was very underdeveloped given the harsh 
terrain that makes up much of this region. It has been argued that with the development 
of oil, the merchants lost not only economic power, but also political power. Scholars 
have stated that the merchants essentially relinquished their political strength for 
economic returns in the form of oil revenues (Crystal 1995). The Bedouin also adapted to 
a more sedentary existence under state rule. Furthermore, the ruling families in the region 
developed new relations not only through their bureaucratic role and the need for 
bureaucratic elites, but also through their role as the provider to the population of 
subsidies and social services (Al-Naqeeb 1990). In fact, it has been asserted that this 
arrangement is present throughout the GCC states – Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. These subsidies and social services are often 
distributed unequally with some societal groups not receiving any direct support from the 
state. 
However, a counterargument can be made to this view of the socio-economic 
evolution of the region. Rosemarie Said Zahlan argues that the structure of Gulf societies 
is a by-product of a particular kind of British rule in the GCC region (Zahlan 1998). The 
British were a colonial force in the region from 1820 to 1971. The British government 
signed separate agreements with the various rulers in the region and a General Treaty of 
Peace, which established these various rulers as separate political units. The British took 
a two-pronged approach in the region. First, they diminished the power of other foreign 
states in the region by drawing up very restrictive agreements and treaties, and, second, 
they negotiated with the various leaders of the region separately. Many of these treaties 
remained until the British left the region in 1971. An important feature of this system was 
the way the British held the rulers personally responsible for fulfilling their treaties and 
only dealt with a particular designated leader in each state (Zahlan 1998).  
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Furthermore, British treaties were structured to protect as well as to isolate the 
Gulf region, leading to states that were very parochial and inward-looking. The British 
government held the right to negotiate on behalf of the Gulf states in all foreign affairs. 
Consequently, the only state that the Gulf region had direct contact with was India, due to 
its ties with Britain. However, in spite of this foreign policy position, the British did not 
develop this region or interfere consistently with local affairs except in the case of 
Bahrain. British interference in Bahrain, the seat of British power and influence in the 
Gulf, saw much more micro-management. Again, the local leaders were held accountable 
to the British and to their own people. Even after oil companies started to enter the region, 
the companies followed suit and negotiated concessions with the individual heads of state. 
In fact, the increased income that came with oil only served to strengthen the position of 
the ruler, as the extra revenue that did not come from taxes and British subsidies could be 
used to build a state structure. 
Oil brought new forces and change that restructured the geo-political makeup of 
the region, but most importantly, it brought stability and the establishment of these states 
as rentier states that relied on the production of a single commodity (petroleum). The 
state and its rulers did not have to depend on citizens for income, but locals had to depend 
on them. If the state relied on anyone, it was foreign oil companies and external 
governments, which themselves served at the pleasure of the state. The state was free 
from extracting resources from tribal, religious and merchant groups to sustain itself. The 
state also became the employer of the people as well as the source of non-oil initiatives. 
However, the state was not totally free from its citizens. In spite of its new wealth it still 
had to seek legitimacy from them.  
Much of this changed with the 1990s and the volatility that petroleum markets 
and prices caused. However, this was not the first or last time oil prices were to fluctuate 
and bring new kinds of change. Of course, immediately after independence from Britain 
in 1971, the confrontation between the Arab states and Israel brought about the 1973 oil 
crisis, which led to the nationalization of a number of the states’ oil industries, coupled 
with a huge boost in oil revenue. This situation led to a big influx of foreign labour as 
most of the GCC states began to build modern infrastructure. It has been estimated that in 
1975, the Gulf region had a labour requirement of 9,728,000; Saudi Arabia had a labour 
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requirement of 1,968,000 with a national workforce of 1,300,000 (Serageldin 1983). In 
spite of this huge and fast increase in wealth, the ways in which the society functioned 
did not change so significantly.  
Of course, the bureaucratic nature of the state increased and the accessibility of 
the rulers decreased, but much of the system that had existed from the onset of British 
rule in the region stayed in place. The rulers were still very much in control and, in fact, 
were now in a position to consolidate their positions by providing employment through a 
system that gave preferential treatment to nationals for civil servant positions. Tim 
Niblock concluded that state bureaucrats as a percentage of the labour force were much 
higher in the GCC states than in other countries: 55.9 per cent for Kuwait, 29.3 per cent 
for UAE, and 26.1 per cent for Saudi Arabia (Niblock 1982). 
This situation was also true when oil prices dropped in the 1980s; however, the 
1990s ushered in a new and more lasting type of change as many of the states 
(particularly Bahrain, Qatar and Oman) started to realize that limited oil reserves would 
not sustain them in the future. Again, oil is seen as the change agent. Its increase and then 
rapid decrease led to social unrest coupled with a realization that economic 
diversification was needed. Diversification was brought about by engaging foreigners in 
sectors outside of oil and a re-emergence of the merchant class. As the economies 
changed in these countries, the foreign labour that was demanded changed as well in 
terms of the level of education and the countries that could supply this new labour force. 
This new foreign class, as well as the re-emerging merchant class, has been associated 
with the diversification of the economies and globalization. 
Also, nationals in the region realized they could not look to their own 
governments for security. Britain had been the protector of these states from 1820 to 
1971. As long as their rulers obeyed the treaties signed with Britain, the British would 
protect them fiercely. These states (many of them tiny and with no real military) came to 
rely on Britain when their security was threatened. 
Once the British began to leave the region in 1971, Saudi Arabia, the largest and 
most powerful of these GCC states, came to assume the role of protector. Saudi Arabia 
was seen to play a ‘big brother’ role in the GCC region by keeping the other states in line. 
However, on 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait on the pretext that a resolution of a 
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border dispute could not be found. The citizens of the GCC were awoken to the fact that 
they could not guarantee their own security without seeking help from outside the region. 
Of course, this time Britain played a supporting role while the United States was the star 
actor. This awakening has meant that many in the region have begun to question not only 
the role of the ruler, but also the fact that they are again confronted with a foreign policy 
path that is very much shaped by their protector.  
Although there are many insights to be had in this account of the development of 
the GCC region, it lacks the complexity of the interworking of the region, which really 
has remained quite stable throughout the periods discussed. In this paper, principal–agent 
theory is employed to capture the multi-layered landscape that exits in the GCC states. 
Who has acted as the principal (person in charge)? Who are the agents (the people who 
report to the principal)? What types of asymmetrical relationships exist between the 
principal and agents? What is the principal–agent problem? 
3. PRINCIPAL–AGENT THEORY 
Principal–agent theory comes out of the economic literature, but has been adapted to look 
at political phenomena as well (Shapiro 2005; Eisenhardt 1989; Moe 1984). Although it 
has not been used extensively by sociologists, the case at hand makes it a very 
appropriate framework of analysis. Principal–agent theory is based on examining the 
difficulties that arise when trying to align the interests of groups of individuals who do 
not always share the same goals and aspirations. The parallel in the sociological literature 
would be to the functionalist approach, which sees social stratification as a functional 
necessity, based on a differentiated system of rewards in which an unequal distribution of 
incentives stems from the functional importance of the respective position and the 
scarcity of qualified personnel (Hoerning 1971; Tumin 1963; Buckley 1958). This 
approach contrasts with an explanation of social stratification as something caused by 
societal norms (non-functionalist approach). Although the functionalist approach is a 
useful framework of analysis that captures some of the elements that exist in the GCC 
states, it lacks the empowerment of the agent that can be seen in the principal–agent 
theory. Other approaches such as patrimonialism and rentier state theory can be means to 
describe the behaviour of the state, but they do not capture or proffer a framework for 
examining the social structure that has evolved in the Gulf (see Brinkerhoff and Crosby 
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2002; Weber 1947; Rudoph and Rudoph 1979; Kochanek 1993; Beblawi and Luciano 
1987; Anderson 1987; Smith 2004). Although clientelism refers to a social organization 
that is common in many developing regions characterized by a patron–client relationship, 
it is most often used in the literature to examine relationships that are typically 
exploitative (see Lasswell 1958; Schmidt et al. 1977; Kettering 1988; Auyero 2001; 
Migdal 1988; Martz 1997). The relationships that exist in the Gulf between the state 
actors and the various social groups cannot be characterized in this way.  
The principals, in the case of the GCC states, are the male rulers who have the 
political and economic power (control of the petroleum industry). Although it can be 
argued that their historical significance is based on societal norms and power structures 
before World War II, an economic argument appears to be a better explanation of why 
this relationship has sustained itself through the various historical epochs. The agents are 
the various groups that make up the population – members of extended families, 
merchants (foreign and indigenous), bureaucrats, women, religious groups (such as the 
Shi’ites in Saudi Arabia), Bedouins, foreign corporations, long-term residents with no 
citizenship (Palestinians and Somalians), and foreign workers, who range from the well 
educated to maids and servants. Again, many of these groups emerged initially due to 
historical rights to citizenship and resources, but their present-day role in society is 
maintained by their economic significance as well as their ability to garner returns from 
the principals for maintaining their role within society. These multiple agents may create 
conflicting goals and mistrust as the principals do not know whether they are carrying out 
their goals. This leads to different incentives, mainly in the form of subsidies and 
monetary compensation, to control the various groups as well as third-party actors.  
Even within these principal/royal families, nepotism interlinked with conflict can 
lead to the selection of less capable principals. This has been particularly relevant among 
the royals of various states in the GCC, where family feuds have often led to bloodshed 
over who should lead and who should follow. A case in point is Abu Dhabi in the early 
part of the twentieth century, when Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayid was murdered by his 
brother in 1922 because the sheikh had discontinued the subsidies usually paid to the 
other royals and was not ruling in a way that other family members found appropriate. 
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 Furthermore, since family members are often compensated generously with 
indefinite job tenure regardless of merit, principals lack the ability to constrain their 
behaviour. All of these factors have led to a much more fluid social structure than is 
recognized in the present literature. This structure is linked to types of agency relations 
(merchants, religious groups, women, etc.) that have resulted in different combinations of 
recruitment, monitoring and sanctioning of practices in terms of the administrative 
system. Almost all of the GCC states have had campaigns and labour laws that have been 
purposely structured to favour the indigenous population. Often this situation has meant 
that the qualifications as well as the productivity of the indigenous labour force have 
lagged behind those of the immigrant population and of less favoured minority groups 
that make up part of the indigenous population.  
This study uses the principal–agent problem as the basis for analysing the states 
that make up the GCC. The study examines each of the six members in the period just 
prior to World War II. In each case, the principals are identified as well as the agents. The 
paper then examines how the principal–agent problem is dealt with in each case and 
between different agents. Each case study recognizes the individual characters and 
characteristics that have shaped the society at hand. The principal–agent theory acts as a 
framework of analysis for comparing and contrasting the various cases. The study looks 
specifically at the agency costs that arise from attempting to solve the principal–agent 
problem, such as designing incentives to align the interests of principal and agent, social 
controls, moral hazard, corruption, policing and the question of who oversees agents. The 
paper will examine the use of professions, family, markets, roles and social exchange to 
identify both principals and agents. 
By examining the social stratification in the GCC states in this framework, this 
study goes beyond viewing the ruling families as all-powerful and all other groups within 
society as passive actors waiting for oil revenues to be bestowed upon them for good 
behaviour. Rather, these are dynamic societies where the agents often have more power 
and say, due to an asymmetrically of information in which the principals often do not 
know what the agents are doing or engaged in at any given time. Therefore, the principal 
must maintain adequate incentives so that the agents continue to abide by the status quo 
as put forth by the ruling families. In fact, it can be argued that it is a testament to the 
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power of this system and the fact that the principals have stayed attuned to the incentives 
necessary to appease the agents that there has been relative stability in the GCC region 
since World War II. Lastly, this study will not overly focus on the tribal system that has 
existed in the GCC region unless it is of value for understanding the socio-economic 
groups that exist today.  
4. KUWAIT 
Kuwait makes a very interesting case study to illustrate the principal–agent theory. Those 
who are able to call themselves Kuwaitis have been able to remain part of a very cohesive 
society for over the past hundred years. Much of this cohesiveness since World War II 
has been due not only to having oil wealth, but to astute leaders who have been able to 
exchange this wealth directly and indirectly with the various factions that make up 
Kuwaiti society. Moreover, this wealth has been distributed in a way that has reaffirmed 
the role of the ruler and, subsequently, the ruling family.  
It has been argued that the patterns of behaviour that were established under the 
British, namely relying on the rulers of the various Gulf states to take personal 
responsibility for treaties and actions that involved Britain and its representatives, helped 
establish this role and the people’s perception of what constituted a legitimate leader. 
This positioning was only reinforced by the development of the oil industry with its 
revenues channelled through the ruler (Zahlan 1998). In spite of this view, it has been 
argued that much of the stability in the Gulf in recent decades is due to the discovery of 
oil and, in fact, the earlier period was a time when the ruler was not seen to have any 
higher status than the merchants that he was dependent upon for revenue (Crystal 1995). 
Yet even this interpretation recognizes the need for a distinction to be made in the case of 
Kuwait that requires a framework other than the commonly used rentier state theory 
(Crystal 1995; Moore 2004). It is argued that rents have been important for the social 
development of Kuwait, but they are not where the ruler gets his legitimacy. 
In the case of Kuwait, one sees that the Al-Sabah family, already well respected, 
had a strong foothold in the society prior to the exit of the British and the substantial 
increases in oil wealth. It is believed that the Al-Sabah family settled in Kuwait in the 
early eighteenth century. They were members of the Anaiza tribe of Nejd. The merchant 
class, which was the dominant economic class at that time, settled around the same period 
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and came from similar tribes. From the start, an unofficial agreement that the Al-Sabahs 
would rule the country while the merchants would be allowed to pursue their business 
affairs was in place. Many of the early economic activities that were pursued were in the 
areas of pearling, boat building and trade.  
Significantly in this earlier period, the ruler, although from the Al-Sabah family, 
ruled autonomously in terms of not feeling the need to confer with his family. Instead, the 
rulers relied on close confidants and key merchants to make decisions (Crystal 1995). It 
was not until 1938 with the Majlis Movement, an uprising by a group mainly composed 
of merchants demanding more political participation, that the relationship between the 
merchants, the ruling family and the ruler started to change. The lead-up to this 
opposition movement was a world economic downturn that affected Kuwait’s economy 
particularly in terms of the pearling industry, which collapsed during this period. 
However, given that the discovery of oil is credited to the same year, there has been 
confusion as to whether it was the oil or the uprising that was the catalyst for change. 
Needless to say, both factors existed; however, it was most probably the uprising that had 
the greatest impact on Sheikh Ahmad Al-Jabir (1885–1950) instead of oil revenues, 
which did not really get under way in any substantial amounts until after World War II.  
Sheikh Ahmad began to rely increasingly on his family members after 1938, but 
mainly due to a sense of betrayal by the merchants. Consequently, we see that even 
before oil rents were substantial, the merchants’ role within society started to evolve as 
the ruler felt that they were not adhering to their implicit duties. This moral hazard 
problem led Sheikh Ahmad to increase the allowances of family members as well as 
move them into key positions.  
The classic principal–agent dilemma arose for Sheikh Abdullah III Al-Salim 
(1895–1965), who followed Sheikh Ahmad as the principal; he found that he was bound 
to select officials from family members, who, once selected, could not necessarily be 
trusted to act as he expected. Royals acted and behaved according to their own whims. 
Sheikh Abdullah had no choice but to formalize the various political functions of family 
members. Furthermore, he used his economic and political power to divide and rule 
within his family by rewarding certain factions with key positions while lowering the 
incomes of those who did not play by his rules.  
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In terms of the merchants, Sheikh Abdullah initially tried to diminish their role. 
Since he no longer needed them for revenue, he made the mistake of thinking that he also 
did not need them for political legitimacy. He had begun to think that oil revenues were 
enough to sustain his legitimacy as ruler. The political inclusiveness that followed the 
turmoil of 1938 had been a very short period of change in terms of political participation 
in Kuwait; however, it is seen as the beginning of a more open society.  
Sheikh Abdullah paved the road for future leaders in recognizing the importance 
of the merchant class as a key agent in the development of the state. He began not only to 
incorporate the merchants again into the political process, but to support them in key 
projects and areas of investment. Crystal (1995) notes that old families rose as modern 
contractors as a result of these state policies, maintaining a strong corporate sense of 
themselves that was reinforced by the Chamber of Commerce and the official stock 
market. Consequently, the merchants began and continue to be an important component 
of the Kuwaiti society. The ruler rewards them not only through social services and non-
taxation, but by creating incentives and a virtual monopoly over domestic business affairs. 
The merchants also help to establish a checks-and-balances system in relation to the 
ruling family members since the two groups often have competing roles within society. In 
many ways, one could argue that the merchant class of today is very much like the 
merchant class that existed a hundred years ago. The merchants keep their role in politics 
to a minimum while looking to the ruler to safeguard their role in society as 
moneymakers.  
In spite of some merchant opposition to various government policies that existed 
in Kuwait in the 1970s and 1980s, the Iraqi occupation of 1990–1 did not lead merchant 
Kuwaitis at any time to question the role of the Al-Sabah family. This situation is a 
testament to the relationship that has evolved between these two groups. Another 
example occurred in the early 1980s when the price of oil dropped, coupled with the 
collapse of the Suq al-Manakh (an informal stock exchange that had developed in 
Kuwait). Merchants were greatly affected by the crisis; however, they never questioned 
the rule of the Al-Sabah family. This was in all likelihood because the ruling family 
stepped in to repay the majority of private debts incurred as a result of the crisis – a 
critical example of the co-optation of support through the redistribution of rent. 
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Kuwait is a constitutional monarchy and is credited with having one of the oldest 
directly elected parliaments in the Arab world. The National Assembly consists of fifty 
elected members, who according to the constitution have a significant say in the affairs of 
state. There has been conflict between the assembly and the emir, which led to periods of 
suspension of the assembly from 1976 to 1981, 1986 to 1991, and May to July 1999. In 
2005, parliament permitted women to vote, which was seen as a significant advancement 
of women’s rights in Kuwait. Furthermore, in 2005, Massouma Mubarak became the 
planning minister and minister of state for administrative development affairs, and this 
was followed by parliamentary elections in 2008 and 2009 with women candidates. In the 
2009 elections, four women won seats (Tetreault and Al-Ghanin 2009). The election of 
women in Kuwait is significant and reflects a desire by the population not just for new 
faces, but for new political ‘groups’ to play an increasing role within society. Although 
these advancements are seen as noteworthy, the emir and his family are still seen as the 
centre of the system in Kuwait. Nikki Keddie notes that there has been a variety of 
reasons put forth as to why the emir supported women’s suffrage, such as a desire to 
lessen the power of the opposition, a response to foreign pressure after the Gulf War of 
1991, and a wish to strengthen the dynasty’s popular base (Keddie 2006). There is also 
still an active Islamist agenda in Kuwait; thus, gains in terms of new roles in education 
and employment must be seen in the context of a conservative social and legal system. 
The significance of the evolution of this social system and the role of the ruler and 
the ruled in Kuwait is that the system has tempered much of the perspective on foreigners 
and foreign labourers in the country. It is estimated that more than 83 per cent of the 
labour force in Kuwait was foreign, as was 68 per cent of the population, in 2006. These 
immigrant workers were of seventy nationalities and were involved in almost every 
sector of the economy (Al-Moosa and McLachlan 1985). Initially, as Kuwait, like its 
other Gulf neighbours, started down a path of development, it found itself very short of 
labour. Consequently, the state encouraged temporary migration from other countries. 
According to the 1980 census, Arab nationals constituted the majority of migrants with 
72.5 per cent, while Asians made up 25 per cent and the remainder were Europeans and 
Americans (Al-Moosa and McLachlan 1985). Today, these figures have changed slightly 
with a decrease in Arab nationals to 64 per cent, Asians now constituting 23 per cent of 
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the migrant community, and the remaining 13 per cent made up of other nationals (CIA 
World Factbook 2010a). Migration, the type of manpower and the nationality of the 
migrants have become debated topics within Kuwait and abroad. Initially, there was a 
very naïve view that migrants were just manpower that could be used as needed and then 
disposed of (sent home). However, after the initial flows into Kuwait in the 1970s, there 
emerged a new awareness that migrants could impact society and that many would seek 
to settle in Kuwait.  
The reaction to this realization was a preference for Asian workers over Arab 
workers, who were seen as being able to integrate better with the indigenous population 
and, subsequently, influence their views and behaviours. This approach to migrant labour 
was not very successful as many of the Asian workers could not communicate adequately 
and often did not have the needed skill sets; consequently, worker productivity was lower 
for Asian workers. Furthermore, many projects that were contracted with foreign firms 
lacked a sense of understanding of the small indigenous labour force; consequently, they 
would often put together a production mix that required much more labour than capital in 
a country that had the reverse dilemma.  
This lack of productivity and poor planning of projects led to extensive 
expenditures and a belief by the ruling family that there needed to be a ‘Kuwaitization’ of 
the labour force. Consequently, labour laws were constructed that favoured Kuwaitis, 
often allowing them to have lower qualifications than foreign-born labourers. In spite of 
this attempt to make the labour force more Kuwaiti, Kuwaitis have continued to cluster in 
two areas of activity: management and services (mainly government). Moreover, there 
has been a decline in the number of Kuwaitis who work in manual labour or clerical jobs 
(Al-Moosa and McLachlan 1985). 
The ‘Kuwaitization’ of the labour force has been seen as causing more problems 
than it has solved. First, there is the problem of low productivity on the part of Kuwaitis 
who know they are practically guaranteed a job. Migrant labourers, on the other hand, 
believe that regardless of how hard they work, they can never replace a Kuwaiti. Second, 
Kuwaitis, particularly those who are part of the ruling family, are promoted regardless of 
qualifications and achievement. Consequently, they often find themselves in positions 
that they are not well suited for, demonstrating the principal–agent problem again. 
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Kuwaitis often think that their jobs and pay are rights of citizenship rather than related to 
job performance (Maktab 2005). Last, the resentment that has set in due to the 
favouritism of Kuwaitis has led to a bifurcation of the society, where Kuwaitis work and 
live with a majority of people from other nationalities but do not actively engage with 
them in terms of questions about the future of the state or its national development. It is 
as though both groups function in a vacuum side by side.  
The preference for Asian workers over Arabs and the expulsion of the 
Palestinians in the wake of the 1990 occupation by Iraq led to an increase in the belief by 
Kuwaitis that there must be a ‘Kuwaitization’ of the labour force (Palestinians supported 
Iraq on the eve of the invasion). In the aftermath of the invasion, Amnesty International 
recorded a large number of human rights abuses, mainly of Palestinians (Casey 2007). 
The Palestinians and Jordanians (many of Palestinian ancestry) made up the largest 
groups in Kuwait before the invasion. They were also the groups that were found in 
surveys to stay the longest in Kuwait, with many having resided as non-citizens for more 
than fifteen years (Al-Moosa and McLachlan 1985). After the Gulf Crisis there was an 
attempt by the Kuwaitis to keep foreigners out. This was made by passing labour laws 
that prevented an over-reliance on foreign labour, but these laws were found to be 
ineffective in a country that was accustomed to having foreigners provide many vital 
services. In interviews with returnees to Jordan after the invasion, many expressed 
anxiety at being expelled to Jordan, a country that they did not know. One returnee 
recounted how her whole life had been in Kuwait, along with her education, and that she 
now felt as if she had lost her nationality (Colton, field notes, 1993).  
From the viewpoint of many Kuwaitis, the principal–agent problem that emerged 
with the Gulf Crisis, namely not being able to trust the foreigners they had sponsored and 
employed, caused the collapse of the social contract that was informally believed to exist. 
Prior to 1990, Arabs in Kuwait had a social contract in the sense that there was a feeling 
that they shared a similar cultural and religious background, which meant that they were 
guaranteed a certain amount of respect and care while in Kuwait. In the 1970s, there was 
much more integration of housing between Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis, and immigrants 
attended free schools along with Kuwaitis. This social contract began to be strained in the 
1980s when the price of oil dropped. The burden of education led the government to 
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encourage private schools for immigrants along with adding charges for some 
educational services. There was also the issue of housing, which led to Kuwaiti versus 
non-Kuwaiti neighbourhoods. Migrants were not allowed to own land, and this led to the 
migrant community living in lower-quality housing in areas isolated from Kuwaitis and 
becoming renters from Kuwaiti landowners. The fallout of the Gulf Crisis has been the 
development of an atmosphere of mistrust between the two communities. 
Where the Asian migrants are concerned, a social contract does not seem to exist. 
Many of the Asians work as domestic servants in Kuwaiti homes, where they average 
two per home. There have been numerous cases documented of abuse of these workers in 
the homes of Kuwaitis (Human Rights Watch 2010a). Furthermore, labour laws do not 
protect domestic workers adequately. The alienation of this community and the fact that 
many of the lower-paying jobs are now done by Asians have led to a demographic 
change. Today the majority of Asian workers are single males who often live in group 
settings to try to minimize the high rents that are often charged by Kuwaitis for 
substandard housing. The preferred groups of Asian migrants are Filipinos, Koreans, 
Indians and Pakistanis. These migrants do not share a common language, culture or social 
habits, and may prove to be much more disruptive to the social stability of Kuwait than 
the Kuwaitis realize, particularly given the lack of inclusiveness of Kuwaiti planning and 
society. 
The final group within Kuwaiti society that seems to be emerging as a very 
important constituency for the ruler is Kuwaiti women. Historically, Kuwaiti women 
were neither seen nor heard. As part of an orthodox Muslim community, they were not 
only secluded but left poorly educated, with their sphere being the neighbourhood where 
they resided. However, women have always played an important role within society. 
They are in charge not only of rearing the children but also of maintaining the social 
order. In fact, Ahn Nga Longva argues that ‘in order to preserve Kuwaiti identity in a 
country where the majority are foreign migrants, certain rules of self-presentation and 
conduct are adopted by the nationals to emphasize their distance from the expatriates and 
maintain their honour’ (Longva 1993: 443). Women are attributed with the important role 
of maintaining this social order.  
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This situation for women has not precluded their evolution within a dynamic 
society. There has been an increase of females in the labour force from 2 per cent in 1970 
to 14 per cent in 1985 (Central Statistical Office, Ministry of Planning 1989). In the 
1960s, 65 per cent of females were illiterate, but in 1989, the majority of students at 
Kuwait University were women (Longva 1993). In spite of these strides in education 
coupled with increases in the wealth of all Kuwaitis (women in Kuwait are allowed to 
hold on to their own wealth), women have not been the socio-economic force for 
modernization that many western scholars were hoping to see, particularly after the Gulf 
Crisis. 
In fact, Kuwaiti women moved more into the labour force and more visible 
aspects of society in the 1960s and 1970s only to retrench by the 1980s. One convincing 
argument for this pattern of behaviour is not the rise of religious fundamentalism, but the 
impact of migrant labour on the Kuwaiti identity and women in particular (Longva 1993). 
Prior to the 1980s, Palestinian women who were educated and came to Kuwait as 
teachers were the role models for young Kuwaiti women who aspired to the workplace. 
This trend changed as more and more Asian females came to Kuwait as unskilled and 
domestic workers. These females often come alone with no social ties to the society or 
families, are often regarded as having a lower status, and are seen as more vulnerable to 
sexual and physical abuse (Nazar and Kouzekanani 2007). 
As Longva points out, Kuwaiti women have become the ‘cultural gatekeepers and 
reproducers’ through the politics of exclusion in exchange for a superior role over the 
non-Kuwaiti population (Longva 1993: 453). It is argued that the abaya is worn not 
solely for religious reasons but also as a way to distinguish Kuwaiti women from foreign 
women. Furthermore, Kuwaiti women have come to regard certain types of work with 
lower-class foreign women as beneath them. Consequently, Kuwaiti women are not 
found throughout the workforce, but clustered in a few high-level, mainly government 
sectors and roles. In fact, part of the social contract that Kuwaiti women have with their 
male counterparts is to maintain a national identity. It can be argued that, unlike what 
many western analysts predicted after the Gulf Crisis in terms of an opening of the 
political system to women, there has actually been a desire by the majority of Kuwaitis to 
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maintain the status quo in the face of so much uncertainty about their national identity 
(Longva 1993). 
Kuwait is a society that is made up of a respected hierarchical structure with the 
ruler as the principal to the various agents. This structure has survived changes to the 
economy while maintaining social order. It is based not on the integration of society but 
rather on its separation, as the various actors know their places. The concept of 
citizenship in Kuwait is itself bifurcated into first- and second-class citizenship, relating 
to the place of origin and whether citizens are descended from urban or Bedouin roots. In 
fact, the ruler is the essential link that holds the society together; consequently, all the 
various social groups respect this role and do not challenge it for fear that it could lead to 
the unravelling of what has been a very stable political arrangement in spite of foreign 
invasion. 
5. SAUDI ARABIA 
To understand the various actors that have evolved to make up the important agents in 
Saudi Arabia, one cannot just begin in the post-World War II period as though the society 
developed in a vacuum, because some of the most important and defining relationships 
from the period before the war have spilled over into Saudi society today. Abdul Aziz ibn 
Abd Al-Rahman ibn Faisal Al-Saud (1876–1953) founded Saudi Arabia. King Abdul 
Aziz consolidated more than half the Arabian Peninsula and the tribes that crisscrossed 
its terrain in the course of a few decades.  
King Abdul Aziz’s rule was based on his religious legitimacy and his reputation 
as a strong leader. Essentially, he solved the principal–agent problem by using decrees 
that discouraged and punished certain behaviour while encouraging and rewarding other 
behaviour. Again, as in the case of other GCC states, much of the care of the state is seen 
not so much in terms of the royal family as in terms of the leaders that were selected from 
the ruling family and empowered through the consensus of the people to be their 
spokesmen, particularly in regard to the British.  
In keeping with a view that existed throughout the GCC states, as the oil industry 
developed, rulers treated the wealth from oil as their private property. Saudi rulers have 
not only used this wealth to reward different groups within society for good behaviour to 
the state, but also used the distribution of this wealth within their own clan as a way of 
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ensuring the future of the royal family. Mark Weston claims that in 1946, the Saudi 
government spent US$10 million on cars and chauffeurs for the royal family but only 
US$750,000 on schools (Weston 2008). In the early years, when oil revenues were in 
huge abundance and merchants as well as clergy were well taken care of by the ruler, 
criticism was rare. Yet the burden of taking care of the growing number of royals who 
seemed to exercise no restraint began to become an issue. In 1951, 55 per cent of the 
government’s budget was allocated to state palaces, princes, and royal establishments 
(Weston 2008).  
King Faisal (1904–75), who became ruler in 1964, had to rescue the state and 
economy from the royals and his brother Saud (initially king until the family replaced 
him with Faisal), who seemed to think that the oil wealth was their personal fortune. King 
Faisal separated the money of the royals from the state and started to increase spending 
on schools, health clinics, water wells and mosques, particularly in rural areas (Trofimov 
2007). King Faisal modernized the Saudi economy through the building of an 
infrastructure. Although he experienced tension with the other royals due to his reducing 
their economic power, he balanced it by encouraging investments by foreign companies, 
and building the educational system in Saudi Arabia (Weston 2008). 
The present king of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah, has followed much in the steps of 
King Faisal in terms of cutting the income of thousands of less-senior princes as well as 
ending many free services and subsidies to royals (Dickey 2009). Although some royals 
have complained, he remains well respected for his political and economic reforms. He is 
also known for not moving forward until there is a consensus among the royals on what is 
‘best’ for Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the rewards that he gives are not as great in terms 
of monetary amounts as were seen in the early years of oil, but the consultation that goes 
on is seen as equal in value. In fact, King Abdullah did away with a rule of succession of 
the ablest eldest son by creating, on 20 October 2006, the Allegiance Institution (Weston 
2008). This council consists of the sons or grandsons of Abdul Aziz appointed by the 
king to represent each of the branches of the family. The king in the future will nominate 
two of his sons or grandsons to be crown prince, and the royal elders will then decide 
who it should be (Weston 2008).  
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As important as the royals are for the king to act and function successfully, in the 
case of Saudi Arabia, the clergy are probably equally or more important in maintaining 
his legitimacy. As mentioned before, this relationship between religious leaders and the 
ruler dates back to King Abdul Aziz. However, all the kings since him have had to 
balance this important relationship. The impact of Wahhabi doctrine and the influence it 
has had on the national identity, coupled with the fact that both Mecca and Medina – the 
two holy cities that Muslims visit as part of a religious haj -- are located on its soil, have 
given the clergy a strength that is unparalleled in other parts of the Arabian Peninsula 
(Dekmejian 1994). R. Hrair Dekmejian has stated that ‘Islam has become, once again, a 
two-edged political instrument – as the Kingdom’s primary medium of self-legitimation, 
and as the main venue of protest for opposition elements’ (Dekmejian 1994: 627). 
Given that the ruler needs the support of the clergy to maintain his legitimacy, the 
clerics are in a powerful position. The general atmosphere in Saudi Arabia during King 
Fahad’s reign was conservative, with radical elements of the religious establishment 
asserting themselves. After the Gulf Crisis in 1990, King Fahad was presented with two 
petitions: one was for a political council, which exists today as the consultative council 
(Majlis Al-Shura); the second, presented in May 1991 (Laidi 2001), was a religious 
petition calling for equal accountability of royals and commoners along with the 
‘purification’ of the country in regard to people, places and events that were considered 
non-Islamic. King Fahad ended up appointing Sheikh Abdulaziz ibn Baz as the 
kingdom’s grand mufti as a way of reducing the tensions over religion in the country 
(Kepel 2004). Sheikh ibn Baz was a great supporter of the royal family while pushing for 
a Salafi agenda within Saudi Arabia. King Fahad had many encounters with religious 
leaders who felt that Islamic rule was not being applied sufficiently. However, it was not 
until the post-9/11 period that King Abdullah as ruler realized the need to make sure that 
the religious establishment was not at the centre of all affairs in Saudi Arabia. Since 9/11, 
a number of steps have been taken with regard to the education system (see Prokop 2003; 
Shea 2009). These reforms have called for a much more tolerant version of Islam in 
Saudi Arabia. However, the clerics remain pivotal to the Saudi equation and, therefore, 
no ruler has called for any separation of religion and the state. Furthermore, such a 
separation would be a redefinition of what Saudi national identity encompasses.  
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One group that makes up a significant portion of the population that has been 
continually discriminated against in various historical epochs in the name of religion is 
the Shia community of Saudi Arabia (see Human Rights Watch 2009a). Much of this 
discrimination has come from the Wahhabis as part of the ruling establishment (Steinberg 
2001). Human Rights Watch states that ‘These repressive measures have fuelled a 
lingering sentiment of discrimination among Shia. They observe how the government 
tolerates inflammatory and intolerant statements by Saudi Sunni clerics directed toward 
the Shia, while preventing the Shia even from simple acts of religious worship such as 
praying together. Underlying state discrimination against Shia includes a justice system 
based on religious law that follows only Sunni interpretations, and an education system 
that excludes Shia from teaching religion, and Shia children from learning about their 
Islamic creed’ (2009a: 2) 
Although the government has extended a number of loans to Shia businessmen at 
different times, the merchant community in Saudi Arabia is very closely aligned with the 
royal family. Particularly in the early years of its development, the government kept in 
place measures that protected Saudi firms from foreign competition while forcing foreign 
companies to take Saudi partners (US Department of State 2008). The business elite of 
Saudi Arabia is made up mainly of family-owned local companies. There is definitely an 
indirect and direct link between this class of citizens and the royals, similar to the case in 
Kuwait. In fact, many royals are engaged in commercial activities through proxies as well 
as through more direct investments (Vassiliev 2000). The king and his regime realize that 
with population growth (Saudi Arabia’s population doubles every twenty-five years), 
linking the economy solely to a commodity that may or may not be in great demand or 
supply in the future is a very dangerous way to behave.1 The process of opening up Saudi 
non-oil markets and reforming the country’s legal system and business climate to 
encourage foreign investment and diversification away from the oil industry has begun; 
however, Saudi Arabia’s business community continues to be dominated by the royal 
family and issues concerning the lack of transparency (US Department of State 2008).  
                                                 
1 The Saudi government has initiated a very ambitious project to build six economic cities that will, it is 
hoped, provide up to 1.3 million jobs, as well as take the economy into non-oil sectors. 
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In spite of the growing population of Saudi Arabia, foreign labourers who rushed 
in at the beginning of rapid development in the 1970s made up more than 27 per cent of 
the population in 2004 and 51 per cent of the workforce in 2006. Like most Kuwaitis, 
most Saudis are found in government employment. However, there is an unemployment 
problem among young Saudis, who are often rejected for work in the private sector 
because they must be paid more and cannot be fired easily (Colton 2010). In fact, 
unemployment in Saudi Arabia is estimated to be as high as 20 per cent, with most of 
those unemployed under the age of 30 (Hardy 2006). Another problem is that many of the 
jobs that are available are considered jobs for foreigners; as a result, many Saudi men 
remain unemployed (Hardy 2006).  
Most of the foreigners today come from South Asia (Central Department of 
Statistics and Information, Saudi Arabia 2004), although at the onset of its economic 
development, Egyptians, Yemenis and Palestinians were more abundant. They were 
found to be more politically risky since they spoke the same language and could engage 
in the political discourse. There is a preference for Asian workers who do not speak the 
language and come from a different culture. However, there have been numerous cases of 
abuse of foreign domestic workers, which has led to changes in the law to safeguard these 
individuals (Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme 2003). 
There are also those within the religious establishment who believe that it is 
against Islam to have all these non-Muslims living and working in the country. Like 
many of the other GCC states, Saudi Arabia has a number of laws and regulations in 
place to keep foreign workers from staying in the kingdom; however, such an approach 
keeps the Saudis from really grasping the fact that as long as they house such a large 
foreign population, they cannot determine the future of Saudi Arabia without factoring in 
these individuals (see Human Rights Watch 2009b). 
Given the role of charitable deeds within Islam as well as the significance of 
religion for the king’s legitimacy, it is not surprising to find that charitable organizations 
play a significant role within Saudi Arabia. These organizations are spread throughout 
Saudi society: from large, internationally known organizations to small charities on the 
local level. Consequently, the government has to maintain its own presence in this arena 
to secure the approval and support of its people (Montagu 2010). Mamoun Fandy notes 
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that the royal family is one with its society not only via government, but also as a group 
that spreads charitable deeds and resources within the larger society (Fandy 1999). 
Consequently, one can view organizations that are not a part of the government as 
informal opposition groups that challenge it on various levels, with the government 
responding with similar community outreach (Montagu 2010). 
The final group within Saudi society that is calling for change is women. Women 
in Saudi Arabia have traditionally had very few rights and have rarely been recognized as 
important contributors to the society and economy (Human Rights Watch 2009b). King 
Faisal was the first king to build schools for girls; however, women have continued to fall 
victim to another important group within society – the clergy. The fundamentalist view of 
women, prevalent in the kingdom, has meant that Saudi women do not enjoy as much 
freedom as other GCC states’ females. Saudi women still cannot drive and must get 
permission from their husbands or fathers for most activities outside the home (Human 
Rights Watch 2009b). Although most young girls in Saudi Arabia today are educated, 
most do not work as there are numerous restrictions on where women can work (Hardy 
2006). Like their Kuwaiti counterparts, Saudi women are part of the national identity. 
Consequently, their dress and behaviour are to be safeguarded to maintain the status quo. 
Furthermore, any discussion of Saudi women must be pursued in the context of the Quran. 
Women have economic rights but few political or social ones, and constitute more than 
58 per cent of all university students in Saudi Arabia but only 15 per cent of the 
workforce (Keddie 2006). Nikki Keddie notes that schools and workplaces are segregated 
by gender; however, ‘elite women with ties to the ruling family can bend the rules’ (2006: 
150). 
What one sees in Saudi Arabia is very similar to Kuwait, where the king is the 
most powerful person in the kingdom; however, he must have the support not only of his 
people, but of his family as well. Moreover, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the king plays a 
very important and enhanced role as the guardian of Islam. From the founding of Saudi 
Arabia until today, the king must be accountable to the Sunni/Wahhabi clergy. This 
situation has led to a significant amount of religious persecution in Saudi Arabia of 
minority religious groups (namely Shia) and the suppression of women’s rights. 
 
23 
 
6. BAHRAIN 
The Sunni Al-Khalifah family rules Bahrain. The family is not originally from Bahrain, 
but migrated in the late 1700s to the region. Bahrain is considered a constitutional 
monarchy. In spite of this fact, there have been much more violence and more revolts in 
Bahrain than in other GCC states (see Katzman 2010). This social unrest is due mainly to 
the diverse societal sects and groups, compared to the relatively homogeneous 
populations in some of the other GCC states. Furthermore, oil has not been as plentiful 
and, as a consequence, the ability of the state to appease all groups within society with 
state funds has been strained. Bahrain is also one of the most urbanized countries in the 
world with about 90 per cent of its population living in two cities – Manama and Al-
Muharraq. It has a large yet fragmented Sunni community, a large Shia community 
(approximately 70 per cent of the population) made up of immigrants from Iran, and the 
Baharinah who are also Shia. The Baharinah have traditionally been located in the 
interior of the country and engaged in agriculture. They are often referred to as the 
original people of the islands. Bahrain is made up of thirty-three islands, which add to the 
variations in its culture. Its merchants come mainly from the Sunni community, where 
they were traditionally involved in pearling and international trade, and are now in the oil 
and banking sectors. Although Bahrain has foreign workers, they do not make up the 
majority of the population (approximately 49 per cent in 2007) or determine the social 
dynamics. Most of the social dynamics have centred on religion and class.  
Significantly in the dynamics of Bahrain, compared with other GCC states where 
Britain tended to play a more passive role, the British played a direct and active role in 
their rule of Bahrain. The British directly shaped the formation of the political 
establishment. For example, in 1923, the political resident (the Gulf states’ regional 
authority for the British during the colonial period) actually took measures to depose the 
ruler in favour of his son (Zahlan 1998). This type of direct intervention was unheard of 
in other parts of the GCC that were under British authority. This role may also help 
explain why the kings (formerly called emirs) of Bahrain have not had the same 
widespread acceptance by the people as in other parts of the GCC. In fact, a nationalist 
movement developed early in Bahrain due to the British presence (Zahlan 1998). 
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Oil was found early on in Bahrain so that farmers and pearl divers became oil 
workers by the mid-1930s, and their children were some of the more educated members 
of the Gulf (Zahlan 1998). This early development of the working class created an 
awareness of labour issues and the formation of labour movements that led to two major 
uprisings by workers against the status quo. The first major incident was in 1938 with 
what was to be known as the reform movement, and then a second major uprising took 
place after World War II (Lawson 1989). This second uprising has been attributed to 
nationalism and anti-colonial sentiments. These riots culminated in a general strike in 
July 1954 with Sunni and Shia leaders calling for greater autonomy (Halliday 1974). 
Political participation has been a continual struggle in Bahrain, where the ruler has used 
force against his people much more freely than in other parts of the Gulf to maintain 
control and stability. 
In the 1970s, Bahrain saw the emergence of an Iranian threat as Iran not only laid 
claim to the territory of Bahrain but was accused of encouraging the Shia community to 
revolt. However, the Shia community maintain that their discontent is tied not to Iran but 
to the unequal treatment they receive in terms of subsidies, social services and political 
disenfranchisement (Sengupta 2006). This Iranian threat is still rejuvenated today when it 
serves Iranian political interests, and it continues to play out poorly for the Shia 
community of Bahrain. Furthermore, the ruling class uses this suspicion as a justification 
for repressive behaviour towards different elements of the Shia community in Bahrain 
(this community is not monolithic, and is divided into Baharinah and Ajam, Arab and 
Persian; Human Rights Watch 1997).  
Saudi Arabia has been instrumental in helping Bahrain diversify its economy into 
banking. The development of the banking sector created a white-collar labour force in 
Bahrain that is now made up of many of the educated children of oil workers and 
foreigners. There are now 400 financial institution; this sector of the economy accounts 
for 27.6 per cent of the US$12.07 billion nominal GDP for 2006 (US Department of State 
2007). 
Given that Bahrain has very limited oil reserves, and a growing middle class 
coupled with an indigenous lower class, there is deep concern regarding the need for 
more political participation (Niethammer 2006). Bahrain has experienced a number of 
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economic downturns in recent years that have fuelled the growth of unemployment, 
particularly among the Shia community.2 A visitor to Bahrain cannot help but be struck 
by the differences between the standard of living of the majority Shia population and that 
of the Sunnis. In Manama, one finds many Shias living in rundown apartment buildings. 
The problem of unemployment, coupled with the lack of political participation, has 
caused various communities within Bahrain to express discontent with their ruler. The 
situation for the Shia community is seen as getting worse; the percentage of high-level 
government posts held by Shias dropped from 25–30 per cent in 1999 to less than 13 per 
cent in 2008 (Bahrain Center for Human Rights 2008).  
The king is supported by external forces, namely Saudi Arabia and the United 
States. The United States has used Bahrain as a military base since the first Gulf Crisis. 
Both Saudi Arabia and the United States have gone out of their way to shore up the status 
of the king (Katzman 2010). Unlike in the other GCC states, the king, Hamad bin Isa Al-
Khalifa, is not in a position to distribute wealth to either the citizens or his ruling family; 
consequently, there is a necessity to share political power as a compromise, which he has 
been reluctant to do. 
The king and his son, Sheikh Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, crown prince 
and commander in chief of the Bahrain Defence Force, have launched a series of 
economic reforms (see Al-Maraj 2008). There seems to be a belief by the ruler that 
although he cannot subsidize his people as do many of the other GCC leaders, he can still 
attain the same result by empowering them through a vibrant economy. Unfortunately, 
the economy has slowed down with the global financial crisis. Moreover, the Shia 
majority continue to charge him with discrimination and inequitable distribution of 
wealth. In the past few years, there have been a number of allegations that foreign Sunnis 
are being awarded Bahrain citizenship as a means of decreasing the Shia population’s 
majority position (Wright 2008).  
The ruling family keeps a strong grip on society because of its inability to appease 
the various social groups with state revenues. Furthermore, a ranking of the indigenous 
population based first on the royals, then the Sunnis, and finally the different groups of 
Shia occurs in Bahrain. Unlike most of the smaller GCC members, which rely mainly on 
                                                 
2 See ‘Bahrain – Unemployment – A Time Bomb’, http://www.allbusiness.com/government/343553-1.html. 
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foreign labour to create economic development, Bahrain does not. International human 
rights organizations have charged the Bahrain government with violations particularly in 
regard to the Shia community (Bahrain Center for Human Rights 2009). Mustafa Alani, a 
security expert at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai, has been quoted as stating, ‘The 
question now that the Arab world is facing is the question of loyalty – how you identify 
yourself’ (MSNBC 2009). In the case of Bahrain, this seems to be particularly true.  
Bahrain offers a number of insights into the question of whether the distribution 
of rents is essential for the ruler in the principal–agent model to sustain legitimacy. The 
ruler has chosen to ensure the support of his direct family and the Sunni community by 
biased treatment of these groups at the expense of the Shia communities. In the case of 
Bahrain, where oil wealth does not afford the ruler a more inclusive approach, one sees a 
society that is easily sent to the streets to protest, but not overthrow. Ruler legitimacy, 
lacking in some parties in society, has been replaced with the increased use of force as a 
way to maintain power; however, this approach is quite problematic in terms of building 
a national identity. 
7. QATAR 
There is no case study that will be presented in this paper that captures more of the spirit 
of the principal–agent problem than that of Qatar. Qatar is a very small community with 
fewer than 123,000 indigenous citizens out of a population of under 667,000 (2006 
figures). It boasts one of the highest per capita GDPs in the world and has the third 
largest natural gas reserves in the world (CIA World Factbook 2010b). Jill Crystal has 
compared Qatar to Kuwait due to its ties to pearling and the historical importance of 
merchant families in terms of their relationship with the ruler (Crystal 1995). Qatar was 
founded in the late 1800s. In 1867, Muhammad Al-Thani became ruler. The Al-Thani 
family has ruled Qatar ever since. Given its small size and population, a class of 
individuals that would be associated with challenging the ruling family for authority has 
never developed. 
In fact, the merchant families that existed at the start of the twentieth century were 
dispersed throughout the Gulf in the 1940s by the impact of World War II on the pearling 
industry. Many of the merchants left for other places. However, there were two trading 
families that remained who would later be noted by scholars of Qatar as having a 
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tremendous impact on both the economic and political development of the state: the Al-
Mani and the Darwish (Crystal 1995). To emphasize, particular members of these 
families had great influence due to the small size of the ruling class in Qatar. 
Probably the most apparent example in Qatar of the principal–agent problem was 
between the Darwish and Al-Mani families and the ruler. Both these merchant families 
came to have very close ties to the rulers in the 1950s. Abdullah Darwish used his 
influence and power with the ruler to become one of the wealthiest men in Qatar, with 
most of the commercial activity of the state in his control (Crystal 1995). 
In addition to bringing more awareness about the wealth of the state among the 
royals in Qatar and other places within the GCC, oil has also meant that many of the less-
educated, tribal and unskilled Qataris could now work for the oil companies. 
Consequently, the dynamics of Qatar centre on the royal family and not on those groups 
within society that deal with it. Unlike the royal families of countries like Saudi Arabia 
that experience infighting within their own confines while keeping a unified public face, 
the Al-Thanis have been more public, with infighting that has spilled over into other parts 
of their society. As recently as 1995, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa deposed his father in a 
bloodless coup. Since then, he has led a movement in Qatar towards liberalization in 
terms of permitting a freer and more open press; however, it has not been at the expense 
of his ruling family.  
Emir Hamad has been seen as the driving force behind the modernization of Qatar, 
which has included giving women the right to vote in 1997, municipal council elections 
in 1998 that included female candidates, and legal system reforms in 1999 (Rathmell and 
Schulze 2000). In an effort to diversify the economy away from oil, he has been at the 
forefront of an effort to ‘brand’ Qatar as an open and tolerant society that plays hosts to 
Al-Jazeera, the pan-Arab satellite television channel, as well as a place for international 
and political forums (Peterson 2006).  
There is foreign labour in Qatar, which makes up the majority of the population 
(80 per cent of total population and 90 per cent of the labour force); however, it has not 
acted as a dynamic force for change within society (Human Development Report 2009). 
Most of the foreign labourers are from South Asia (Human Development Report 2009). 
Although there are still a large number of fellow Arabs working in Qatar, there has been 
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a preference in the last two decades for South Asians, who are seen as less disruptive to 
the local social order. Most of the foreign labour works in the private sector since 
government jobs are reserved for Qatari citizens as part of the ‘Qatarization’ programme.3 
As part of this programme, the government has tightened the rules on the use of foreign 
labour as well as creating financial incentives for firms to employ Qataris (Cordesman 
1997). In spite of these rules, the only major successes have been in senior-level positions; 
educated Qataris have returned sometimes from abroad to assume these positions at the 
expense of white-collar foreign labour. All workers are prohibited from striking or 
forming labour unions. Since foreign labourers must have citizens to sponsor them to 
receive visas, they serve at the pleasure of the Qatari nationals. 
Consequently, Qatar very early on in its development had an upper class made up 
of the royals and a few very powerful, indigenous merchant families that had close ties 
with the ruler, and a middle class that evolved from fishermen and pearl divers that today 
looks to the ruler for economic support. Qatar is a bifurcated society. However, as 
education increases, there is a middle class made up of Qataris that emerged from the 
working class of the 1950s. Part of the reason that this did not evolve sooner in Qatar is 
that there was no societal pressure to move social and economic development along at a 
faster pace until the 1960s.4 Although Qatar has seen an opening of its political system, it 
is still centred on the royal family and in particular the emir. One of the main reasons this 
situation exists is that the regime has refused to give up control of state finances or make 
a distinction between the income of the state and the income of the ruler (Rathmell and 
Schulze 2000). 
Today, Qatar remains a very tight-knit society with the royals and a few key 
business families in control. Class is very much a part of contemporary Qatar society, 
with its haves and have-nots. Emir Hamad is very much aware of the needs of his people 
and although he has spread the wealth to the indigenous population, he serves at the 
pleasure of the other royals as well. In fact, one of the arguments put forth as to why he 
                                                 
3 ‘Qatarization’ refers to a programme designed to increase the number of Qatari nationals in all joint 
venture industries and government departments. The target is 50 per cent of the workforce in industry and 
energy. 
4 It was in the 1960s that Qatar and the other GCC states began to emerge as a key part of the globalization 
process. 
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has been so willing to embrace political reforms is that he has been appeasing the 
younger royals (Rathmell and Schulze 2000).  
This approach to managing the various interests within the society has proven 
effective. Emir Hamad has been able to decrease government expenditures and subsidies 
when oil prices drop, unlike other rulers in the region who have to worry about social 
discontent. In fact, other states in the region have felt compelled to maintain expenditures, 
even in the face of decreased government revenues, for fear of social unrest (Aartun 
2002). Qatar is a state with a strong ruler who maintains his relationships with the various 
agents in society to bring about a peaceful co-existence. 
8. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates: Abu Dhabi, Ajman, 
Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain. The ruler of Abu Dhabi, 
Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, is the president of the UAE. The small states that 
make up the UAE were known as the Trucial States up until 1971 because they all had 
signed the same agreements with Britain. Historically, there has been more infighting, 
particularly over succession, in the states of the UAE than in other parts of the GCC. In 
fact, it has not been uncommon for a brother to kill a brother over dissatisfaction with 
how affairs were being run or over the amount of the royal subsidies received. Both the 
Al-Nahyan and the Al-Maktoum of Dubai are members of the Bani Yas tribal groupings. 
Dubai is a very fast-paced modern city. It is often referred to as a corporate city, given 
both the high level of foreigners and a number of white-collar workers. Moreover, the Al-
Maktoum and their extended family are actively involved in businesses. In the states that 
are part of the UAE, rulers use the role of the state to enrich themselves, to provide for 
their inner circle, and to invest in education and social services for their populations. The 
government provides citizens with free housing, health care and education while 
subsidizing water and electricity.  
Poverty still exists among the citizens of the UAE, but most poor individuals are 
widows, divorcees, orphans, disabled individuals and the families of prisoners. In 
addition to the role of the ruler in the individual states of the UAE in relation to their 
population, the ruling family of Abu Dhabi plays a further role in regard to the other 
smaller emirates and to Dubai to a lesser extent. Anne Louise Aartun argues that, on the 
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federal level, Abu Dhabi’s ruler is the head of state and the ruling families of the smaller 
emirates are his officials. In a way that reflects what happens at the state level, Abu 
Dhabi’s subsidies of the smaller emirates are presumed to correlate with these smaller 
states’ ruling families’ loyalty to the ruling family in Abu Dhabi (Aartun 2002).   
Andrea Rugh identifies three external factors that shaped the personal rule of 
leaders throughout the UAE: (1) the role of the British, (2) urbanization and (3) oil wealth 
(Rugh 2007). In terms of the role of the British, who supported the ruler with force if 
necessary, tribes and other actors in these states realized that the only power available 
within society was economic via the ruler. Consequently, most of these states resemble 
corporate structures rather than political states. As for urbanization, given the topology 
and the importance of coastal areas, most of the development and the resources available 
are concentrated into single cities, which has resulted in a huge movement to the coastal 
towns. Finally, not only is oil wealth distributed among the royals, but they undertake 
huge public works and social service projects in their states. The ruler no longer needs 
subsidies from the British or tax revenue from his people to fund his role (Rugh 2007). 
The governments of the various states in the UAE are careful to make sure that the citizen 
population receives the care they are accustomed to (subsidies in education, health 
services, national and social security, subsidies for water and electricity, etc.) even when 
the economy is down due to reduced oil revenues (Aartun 2002).  
On the federal level, there is tension between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Dubai used 
the global market of the 1990s to expand and develop at a very rapid rate while Abu 
Dhabi has moved much more cautiously. Consequently, world markets held their breath 
waiting for Abu Dhabi to provide assistance to Dubai when the global financial crisis 
negatively impacted its stock and real estate markets.5 Abu Dhabi produces about 90 per 
cent of the total barrels of oil produced in the UAE in a year along with holding 92 per 
cent of the UAE gas reserves (Aartun 2002). Consequently, there has evolved a 
principal–agent relationship in the UAE between Abu Dhabi as the principal and the 
other emirates as the agents. Aartun alleges that the smaller emirates do not publish their 
                                                 
5 For example, the recent financial crisis in Dubai over the government having to defer its international debt 
repayments of US$60 billion produced a lot of speculation about the relationship between Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai. The recognition that Abu Dhabi did not jump in immediately to rescue Dubai was followed by an 
acknowledgement that if it did, Abu Dhabi would become the sole financial guarantor for the UAE (Lewis 
2009). 
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accounts because they are sensitive to the fact that they receive such large subsidies from 
Abu Dhabi (Aartun 2002: 50). In exchange for these subsidies, these smaller emirates 
support Abu Dhabi and its ruling family in most matters. The exception to this is Dubai, 
which is seen as an economically powerful emirate as well. It can be argued that much of 
the drive by Dubai to diversify into non-oil sectors, which often require a heavy 
dependency on foreign labour, is to break into sectors that would allow it to escape some 
of the dependency not only on the oil industry, but on Abu Dhabi as well. However, 
Dubai’s inability in 2009 to meet its financial obligations proved its vulnerability not 
only to globalization but to Abu Dhabi as a financial guarantor.  
Rugh (2007) makes a very interesting point about the UAE: governance is based 
on personal relations more than on formal institutions. Rugh states that there is an 
insider/outsider mentality, with a parental, hierarchical and enduring family model 
contrasting with more aloof relationships with foreigners. The UAE often seems from 
outside to be a rule-based society in which a diverse group of foreigners is controlled 
through agreements and laws.  
The UAE has pacified its national population by ensuring they are provided for at 
all times. In the 1980s, when state revenues were decreased due to declining oil revenues, 
public expenditures decreased only slightly while social services were maintained 
(Central Bank of the UAE 1984). This situation may help explain why the UAE has 
enjoyed much more stability than other parts of the GCC in spite of the fact that they do 
not have elected officials. 
The role of families is paramount in the UAE states as rulers who historically 
have not positioned their relatives in roles they would be content with often found their 
position challenged. Positions of power and rule are also used throughout the UAE as a 
means of drawing in various family members. Like most of the other GCC states, the 
UAE has passed laws to attempt to protect the indigenous population from 
unemployment due to foreign labour. Laws in the UAE require private companies to have 
a certain percentage of their workforce made up of UAE citizens. There were an 
estimated 3.3 million foreigners living in the UAE in 2005, constituting about 80 per cent 
of the population. Most of these labourers come from South and Southeast Asia. Of these 
workers, 600,000 are domestic workers. These workers report being denied health care 
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and not having safe working or living conditions (Human Rights Watch 2010b). In spite 
of the perception that the UAE receives a large number of educated labourers due to its 
liberalization and diversification of the economy (it is still heavily dependent on oil and 
gas revenues), its foreign labour force is mainly blue-collar. There has also been a decline 
in the number of Arabs working as expatriates in the UAE. It has decreased from a high 
in the 1970s of 26 per cent of the foreign labour force to less than 10 per cent in recent 
years. Asian labourers are preferred because they are considered less of a security 
concern; however, there have been growing outcries by expatriates concerning ill 
treatment and conditions (Human Rights Watch 2010b). Recently, international pressure 
has led to changes in some labour laws to protect workers (Constantine 2010). However, 
there remains an attitude in much of the UAE that if expatriates are unhappy with their 
situation, they can always return home and be replaced by the perceived millions of 
workers that wait offshore for an opportunity to work in the UAE (Colton, field notes, 
June 2010).  
The labour laws are biased towards UAE citizens and recently, with the financial 
downturn, more laws were passed that make it difficult for a UAE national to be 
dismissed due to economic reasons (Issa and Al-Lawati 2009). This situation leads to the 
same moral hazard problem mentioned earlier in the paper in which private or foreign 
businesses find it almost impossible to discipline or manage locals. There are also labour 
laws that forbid foreigners in the country to organize into unions; consequently, 
foreigners who are unhappy with the situation have only one choice -- to leave. However, 
even leaving is made more complicated as one must get an exit visa, which is contingent 
on the agreement of one’s employer. Some employers hold labourers’ passports as a 
guarantee that they will not attempt to leave without their knowledge. White-collar 
workers  seem to have more, but even this group was found leaving in the night during 
the recent financial crisis. In Dubai, stories abound of hundreds of cars abandoned at the 
airport during the financial downturn due to debt-ridden expatriates fleeing the country 
rather than face prison sentences for not meeting their debt obligations.6 
                                                 
6 In the UAE, the law states that individuals who write unsupported cheques will face prison sentences. 
Many lenders ask customers to write out cheques for the entire period of the loan in advance as a way of 
using this law to make sure the borrowers pay their debt.  
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Consequently, the UAE is developing into a very successful cluster of emirates 
that is seen to be extremely active not only in terms of the oil industry, but in other types 
of business endeavours as well. As in other GCC states, one sees the foreign population 
marginalized and isolated by the indigenous population in spite of the fact that the 
foreigners make up the majority of the population and are the true engine to growth. 
Given the high number of foreign nationals and the fact that most of the population 
growth in the past ten years has been due to the increase in foreigners, it is hard to think 
of the UAE as a developed society, since only a fraction of its occupants (those with 
UAE nationality) have a say in its future development and that fraction does not even 
have the right to vote.  
In Dubai today, important discussions have begun not only about the role that 
foreign labour will play in the future, but about the extent to which the country wants to 
incorporate this foreign population into the wider society. There are many costs as well as 
benefits of having such a significant number of people as transient residents. Probably the 
largest cost is that there are no shared aspirations by this group in terms of the future for 
the society. The benefit of keeping this foreign population on the periphery is that they 
come from such varied and different cultures and socio-economic systems that the task of 
trying to find a common national theme that would continue to ensure stability might be 
overwhelming. It would also divert the attention of economic development to state 
building, which appears to be a luxury that the emirates do not want to engage in at this 
point in their history. Furthermore, the UAE is unique and complex in that it is made up 
of seven emirates each with powerful rulers that manage the dynamics of their society, 
yet are a part of a larger principal–agent relationship that sees Abu Dhabi as the principal. 
9. OMAN 
In the past thirty-plus years, Oman has been able to use its oil wealth not only to 
strengthen a sense of national identity through the distribution of social services, but to 
enable the ruler to strengthen his tacit political power as well. Oman has consolidated 
much of the political power within one individual, but not without some political 
discourse. The diversity within Omani society that seems to have come together to make 
a relatively cohesive society is impressive. There are still ethnic minorities that feel 
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marginalized within present-day Oman, but the sultan has been very astute in bringing 
such groups into the mainstream of society (Valeri 2009). 
A very common approach to examining Omani society is via its geography. First, 
one of the main reasons that Oman has not had as much in common with many of the 
other GCC states is that it has been geographically isolated from the other states. The 
country borders one of the largest deserts in the world -- the Rub’ al-Khali. It also borders 
the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman in the south. There has always been a distinction 
between the interior and the coastal inhabitants. In fact, the inland highlands are home to 
a variety of tribes that have their own language and culture.  
Although the dominant religion is that of Sunni Muslims known as Ibadis, there 
are also Shia Muslims as well as Hindu sects. The ruling family, Al Bu Said, belongs to 
the Ibadi sect. Ibadism is its own school of Islamic thought and has rules that are closely 
associated with the Maliki school of Sunni Islam.7 It is believed that approximately 45 per 
cent of the Omani population belongs to this sect, with 50 per cent other Sunni and less 
than 5 per cent Shia and Hindu (Peterson 2004a). In spite of these religious differences, it 
is really the language and geographical differences that have kept these tribes historically 
from forming a more cohesive society. 
In fact, in the late nineteenth century, the Oman empire started to lose its 
economic gains to the Europeans, which resulted in economic hardship for Oman. This 
situation led to a split in the Al Bu Said family, with a member being elected imam in the 
interior. It was not until 1954, on the death of the imam of Oman, that Sultan Said bin 
Taymur united the country with the help of the British. Although the oil industry started 
to develop in the late 1960s, it was not until the 1970s that the industry really started to 
have a revenue effect on Oman. With the exit of the British in 1971, Sultan Qaboos began 
to use the new wealth of the state to consolidate his country.8 Sultan Qaboos not only 
established himself as the ruler of Oman but, by developing a new perception of what 
collective identity means in Oman, has put forth an Oman identity that is based not on 
geography or tribalism but on national identity, like other GCC states (Valeri 2009). Yet 
                                                 
7 The Maliki school is one of the four schools of Islamic law. 
8 Britain still had Royal Air Force bases in Masirah and Salalah until 1977. 
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this new framing of Omani nationalism is not without its shortcomings, which now 
appear to be more socio-economic than tribal. 
A case in point of changing identities is the peoples of the south. The Dhofar 
province has historically had close ties with Yemen and East Africa. Although the 
province is sparsely populated, its people have a variety of backgrounds and languages. 
Many of the residents have African roots while others trace their origin to South Yemen. 
Due to the oppressive rule of Sultan Qaboos’ father when he resided in Salalah, there has 
been more opposition to the sultan from this region than in any other part of Oman. The 
Dhofar rebellion was brought under control in 1975. The largest group that speaks Arabic 
is the Al Kathir tribe. They are closely associated with the Al-Qara tribe that is found in 
the surrounding mountains, which are inhabited by a number of smaller clans. They have 
their own distinct dialect that is a mix of ancient Southern Yemeni dialects and Arabic 
(Halliday 1974).  
In addition to these major tribes, there are a number of groups of protected people 
who are non-tribal. These groups include the Al-Shahra, Al-Mashayikh, Al-Bara’ima and 
Al-Hikman (Peterson 2004b). These non-tribal groups are usually seen as inferior and are 
not allowed to carry arms or marry into tribal families. There is also a sizeable African 
community in Salalah who are believed to originate from former slaves. As well, there is 
a group known as Al-Bahhara who are very poor Africans. Many of those involved in the 
uprising in the 1960s were from these two groups, and J. E. Peterson notes that there is 
still suspicion about these individuals among other Omanis today (Peterson 2004b). 
Southern Oman continues to be an important balancing act for the sultan in spite 
of the fact that it makes up a very small portion of the population. However, it has been 
the home of past resistance movements, and as recently as 2005, it witnessed again a 
small revolt by a group of Ibadi zealots who were accused of plotting against the regime 
(Peterson 2006). In spite of an effort by the sultan to integrate the south, there remain two 
sticking points: one is Ibadis who believe there should be an imamate; the second is 
individuals of African descent who still feel disenfranchised by the state.  
The sultan has attempted to spread the wealth from oil. Because of the 
modernization of the south, with schools, health centres, mosques, wells for livestock and 
roads, a new generation of youth are starting to define themselves less by their dialect and 
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ancestors and more by their national identity as Omanis. This situation is particularly true 
in the light of increasing migrant labour that does not dress or behave like ‘Omanis’. In 
fact, it is interesting to note that as much as 40 per cent of government resources were 
spent in the Dhofar province following the war while the region makes up only 10 to 25 
per cent of the indigenous population (Peterson 2004b).  
Oman is similar to other parts of the GCC where oil wealth and the access to 
resources by right of one’s citizenship have led to privilege. This phenomenon has an 
impact in Southern Oman. Sultan Qaboos has made a point of appointing a 
disproportionate number of individuals from this region to lower-level government posts. 
He has also allowed various appointed officials to benefit from public contracts and 
enrich themselves and their kin as a way of ensuring loyalty (Townsend 1977). 
Furthermore, the sultan has used various tribal groups not only in the Dhofar war, but as 
special forces for the army and in other civil service positions. In fact, Peterson estimates 
that as many as half of all Dhofaris are supported by the government (Peterson 2004b). 
There has also been a lot of migration to the north as opportunities in Muscat and 
surrounding areas have increased.  
This has been a very effective way of incorporating the tribesmen in terms not 
only of giving them government positions, but of spreading financial resources to these 
interior mountain tribes. A number of laws have passed that prohibit tribal warfare and 
the distinguishing of groups of Omanis as inferior to other groups within society. 
However, in spite of these various measures, Valeri has noted that Sultan Qaboos has 
unintentionally repolarized Omani society because individuals are more aware of their 
origin, class and language than their common national identity (Valeri 2009).  
The northern part of Oman also has a number of small ethnically diverse groups, 
although its population is often viewed as being more unified as Arabic-speaking 
Muslims/Ibadis. Yet where the people of the south are more distinct due to language and 
geography, those of the north are more distinct due to religion and ethnicity. One of the 
best examples of this distinction is the Baluchis. These individuals’ origin lies in Oman’s 
grand maritime past when many came from Pakistan to Oman and settled. They are 
considered non-Arabs and have their own language. Religiously they are Sunni Muslims. 
Peterson estimates that they may constitute 12 per cent of the Omani population 
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(Peterson 2004a). Because they have occupied positions that have not paid well, they are 
considered on the fringe of Omani mainstream society. In fact, Peterson states: ‘Because 
of their socioeconomic status and perceptions of discrimination, younger Baluch exhibit 
signs of alienation and, interestingly, sometimes identify with “black power” expressions 
similar to African-Americans and the Caribbean populations of the United Kingdom’ 
(Peterson 2004a: 36). 
There is also a merchant class in Oman made up of Hindu Indians. This group 
dates back to the nineteenth century, when they were involved in all aspects of trade 
(Speece 1989). Unlike in other parts of the Gulf, Omanis and foreign labourers often 
work in the same fields and compete for the same jobs. When economic times are poor, 
the tension between the two groups can be fierce. Marc Valeri quotes an Omani as stating 
that if an Omani is placed in charge of an Indian, the Indian will make things difficult for 
the Omani, on whom this will reflect badly: ‘.it is not Omanisation, it is Indianisation!’ 
(Valeri 2009: 228).  
Another group is the Lawatiyya, who are, like the Hindus, a merchant class. The 
question of religion plays an important role alongside economic considerations. The 
Lawatiyya are Shia Muslims of the coast. As a merchant class, they have not had a lot of 
interest in politics even if they have been accused of being sympathetic to the Iranian 
cause. It is interesting to note that both the Lawatiyya and Hindus are considered 
foreigners regardless of their origin.  
Again, as in the south, one finds a group of Omanis of African origin settled in the 
north, many of whom trace their roots to Zanzibar. Many of these Zanzibaris work in the 
petroleum industry and were instrumental in the early days of economic development in 
Oman; however, just like their southern counterparts, some have been met with suspicion 
and discrimination due to their African roots. As stated earlier, the trend in Oman today is 
to organize less by these ethnic distinctions and more in terms of being Omani versus 
non-Omani. Rather than viewing this as creating a polarized society, as may be the case 
in such places as the UAE, in Oman we see that it has helped build a national identity 
among opposing groups. As in other states in the Gulf, there has been a push to make 
sure that key civil servant positions are held for nationals. There has also been political 
participation in terms of consultation with the sultan for those who are identified as 
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Omani. However, the question of who is an Omani is very complex and dynamic. In 
Salalah, the word ‘Omani’ refers in all cases to northern Arabs or Baluchis (Valeri 2009).  
In fact, the modernization of Oman has created much more integration of society 
than in other places in the GCC as new modern housing projects group together 
individuals of various ethnicities. The most striking example is the Lawatiyya community, 
which is considered Omani and consequently is incorporated regardless of its Shia 
religion, while the Hindus are not considered Omanis and so remain outside mainstream 
Omani society.  
Oman is more unified today than it has ever been; however, that does not mean 
that groups such as the Baluchis do not remain discriminated against, as do other such 
fringe minorities. Furthermore, a new division is emerging in modern Oman that is much 
more about one’s wealth and political/social standing than one’s tribal roots. However, in 
spite of the splintering of society, all groups look to the sultan as the distributor of 
resources and no one questions his authority. For the emerging youth population, 
education and opportunities are coming to play a much more important role in how they 
identify themselves than does tribal affiliation. Given the fact that economic opportunities 
for this generation are associated with urban centres, a new regional identity has emerged 
as well. This new system is based on money and safeguarding the system via the 
sultanate. As stated by Valeri, ‘With the remarkable achievements in technical, economic 
and social development, there has been a rewriting of identity frames of reference around 
the person of Qaboos, identified in the new historiography with the contemporary welfare 
state and consequently with Oman itself’ (Valeri 2009: 252). Oman, like other parts of 
the Gulf, is a society that is based first on nationalism and then on nepotism or economic 
proximity to the ruler. 
10. CONCLUSION 
In the various case studies presented in this paper, a common theme is predominant: the 
principal is not the royals or ministers, but rather the ruler himself. His legitimacy comes 
not only from his citizens, who are made up of various tribally rooted groups, foreigners 
and religious sects, but from his kin as well. Consequently, he is continually making sure 
that his kin are satisfied with his rule. This can even mean at times going against what he 
sees as being in the interest of the minority groups within society – foreigners, religious 
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minorities, women, ethnic groups and tribes. The principal performs a constant juggling 
act in which he is trying to keep the various agents in line not only in terms of the state, 
but in terms of their behaviour to each other. Due to the fact that there is much diversity 
in these GCC states, there is very little cohesiveness and, in fact, the system is sustained 
by keeping groups in their hierarchical place rather than having them mix. 
It is important not to be blinkered by the sense of stability in the region and miss 
acknowledging the infighting and alienation that have happened within various ruling 
families and between social groups. In some historical cases, the ruler has become so 
disliked due to various policy decisions that he has been killed by a brother or son as a 
means of bringing about a change of leadership. It is also interesting to note that the 
rulers have often been described as being very selfish and imprudent with the resources 
of the state. However, most of the rulers have directed the resources of the state to the 
more vocal groups in society in an effort to keep stability within society and the royal 
family so that they can continue to rule. These states are much less authoritarian than is 
often understood. The ruler is constantly trying to keep moral hazard from setting in as he 
tries to keep the various actors from creating disorder, in resentment at not being 
provided with enough or because of feeling disenfranchised politically in a system that is 
built on exclusiveness. Consequently, he uses many of the classic means of solving this 
problem by trying to monitor the various actors or by having restrictive rules that either 
encourage or discourage certain behaviour through a carrot-and-stick approach. 
We see, therefore, that social stratification in the Gulf is based on one’s affiliation 
to the ruling family first and foremost. This situation creates a number of divides within 
society. The most important division is based on nationality (see appendix). Whether or 
not one is considered a national of the country of residence is extremely important in 
determining one’s place in society and entitlements. Among nationals, we see a further 
breakdown based on whether one shares the same religion of the ruler, tribal connections 
and regional location. However, modernization and the emergence of more bureaucratic 
structures have meant that in many of these states the tribes and their relationship to the 
ruler have become more distant. This has meant less power and authority for tribal 
sheikhs. Religious leaders associated with the ruling family, particularly in the case of 
Saudi Arabia, however, have still retained power and a close relationship to the ruler. 
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Replacing the tribes in terms of proximity to the ruling family is a growing new 
professional/educated elite.  
As witnessed in the case of Qatar, the new elite that is aligned with the ruler is a 
young, educated class that feels as comfortable with the west as it does with the east. This 
class is seen as a necessity to the transformation of these states into modern, globalized 
nations. Consequently, they continue to make inroads throughout the Gulf. As stated by 
Mordechai Abir in the case of Saudi Arabia, ‘Power, wealth and education are a by-
product of this affiliation to the ruling family (Abir 1988: 3). 
In terms of non-nationals, they are seen as the group farthest from the ruling 
family and, therefore, hold minimum rights within society while in many GCC countries 
making up a large and growing segment of the population. Their role within society is 
solely as an economic agent; consequently, those with more human capital (education 
and skills) are granted more rights and privileges. This is reflected in immigration and 
labour policies that often see domestic workers as outside these regulations. The issues of 
foreign labour have not been dealt with in a way that truly recognizes that the economic 
growth of most of these states has taken place and will continue to take place dependent 
on these expatriates. It is misleading to talk about a national identity emerging in 
conjunction with oil revenues when in most of these states the majority of its residents, 
who are involuntarily given temporary status, have no say in how the country will 
develop. The lack of a balanced immigration policy that recognizes the important role 
that immigrant labour plays in the development of these societies is a cause for concern 
about the future stability of these states. Although there are campaigns throughout the 
Gulf to nationalize the labour force, the process is slow and in many respects continues to 
emphasize the importance of nationality, consequently fuelling the tensions between 
nationals and non-nationals. 
In addition to nationality and affiliation to the ruling family, there is the question 
of gender. As illustrated in the case of Kuwait, women are often looked on as the 
‘keepers’ of the status quo. Through dress and behaviour that often segregate women 
from men, nationality and the entitlements that it grants are asserted. Moreover, the 
majority of non-nationals are males. In fact, if one examines trends for women nationals, 
one observes that from the 1950s to today many rulers in the Gulf have taken steps to 
41 
 
advance women’s rights, even if not as quickly as some western observers would like 
(Keddie 2006). Furthermore, women’s education in this region has increased at a rapid 
rate, with women making up about half those attending university in many of these 
countries. Yet women have not received equal treatment in the workplace and Islamists 
have used western support for gender equality as grounds to attack it as being un-Islamic 
(Keddie 2006). For non-national females, these policies and changes have not applied and 
they often find themselves at the lowest levels of society in terms of rights, pay and 
protection by the law. Consequently, a system based first on nationality, with all its 
complexities, and then on nationality and gender is present within these states. 
In the GCC states, globalism has been embraced in the marketplace, but has been 
received with localism on the societal level.9 Most of the indigenous population sees oil 
revenues and the subsidies and state favours associated with this wealth as something to 
be protected from outsiders. The ruling family and, moreover, the ruler become the centre 
of this system where little distinction exists between the income of the state and the 
income of the ruler. Although it would be tempting to see some of the political expression 
that is emerging in the GCC as a breakdown of this traditional system of stratification, the 
fact that the finances of the state as well as sovereign wealth funds remain shrouded in 
secrecy is problematic. The traditional system of social stratification and entitlement is at 
the very centre of this system. It can be argued that had these states not become so 
dependent on this single commodity, they might have started to open their societies to the 
integration of social/ethnic groups as many other nations that find immigrant labour 
essential for economic development have done. In certain GCC states there is a slow 
opening of the political system that may eventually lead to an opening of the 
economic/finances of the state as well. Consequently, as the world economy continues to 
encroach on these states, a new generation of rulers that rethink the present system at 
hand may be seen. They may find it in the interest of the state to explore new societal and 
political paradigms that go beyond the principal–agent relationship. 
                                                 
9 Globalism refers to the networks of connections that now span continents. See Nye (2002). 
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APPENDIX 
 Figure 1. Population figures for nationals and non-nationals in GCC states 
Nationals Non-nationals  Males Females Total Males Females Total Total 
Bahrain1 266,420 261,013 527,433 365,654 146,209 511,864 1,039,297 
Kuwait2 501,148 522,168 1,023,316 1,510,818 648,826 2,159,644 3,182,960 
Oman3 900,540 881,018 1,781558 412,699 146,558 559,257 2,340,815 
Qatar4 60,782 61,997 122,779 429,580 114,150 543,730 666,509 
Saudi 
Arabia5 8,287,370 8,239,970 16,527,340 4,269,870 1,881,052 6,150,922 22,678,262 
United Arab 
Emirates6 417,917 407,578 825,495 2,388,224 892,708 3,280,932 4,106,427 
 
 
Figure 2. Labour force figures for nationals and non-nationals in GCC states 
 Nationals Non-nationals 
Country Males Females Total Males Females Total Total 
Bahrain7 67,871 33,810 101,681 264,054 13,736 277,790 379,471 
Kuwait2 198,843 142,342 341,185 1,295,173 326,597 1,621,770 1,962,955 
Oman8 582,649 164,750 747,300 403,207 50,607 483,814 1,231,114 
Qatar4 39,541 20,821 60,362 416,274 59,171 475,445 535,807 
Saudi 
Arabia9 3,230,201 670,391 3,900,592 3,550,347 573,943 4,124,290 8,024,882 
United 
Arab 
Emirates10 171,000 49,000 220,000 2,117,000 310,000 2,427,000 2,647,000 
 
Sources:        
1 (2007) http://www.cio.gov.bh/StatPublication/11RecurrentRequest/AdjPop2001-2007.pdf 
2 (2006) http://www.kibs.edu.kw/eikgcc.html 
3 (2003) http://omancensus.net/english/pdf_files/final_results.pdf  
4 (2006) http://www.qsa.gov.qa/Eng/publication/Annabs2008.htm Population Table No.20 
5 (2004) http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/showcatalog.aspx?lid=26&cgid=1096, summation of the data on page 37 
of each of the administrative documents linked here  
6 (2005) 
http://www.economy.ae/Arabic/EconomicAndStatisticReports/StatisticReports/Documents/Statistic%20R
eports/UAE%20in%20Numbers/UAE%20Figures2007.pdf 
7 (2007) http://www.undp.org.bh/Files/2008MDGPROREP/Goal3-BHR-MDG-PROREP.pdf 
8 (2003) http://omancensus.net/english/first_publication.asp/SectionThree 
9 (2006) http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/showcatalog.aspx?lid=26&cgid=1002, Labour Force ( 15 Years And 
Over ) By Age Group And Sex and Saudi Labour Force ( 15 Years And Over) By Age Group And Sex 
links  
10 (2006) 
http://www.economy.ae/Arabic/EconomicAndStatisticReports/StatisticReports/Documents/Statistic%20R
eports/UAE%20in%20Numbers/UAE%20Figures2007.pdf 
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